Difference between revisions of "Weak Defensive Strategy criterion"

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(Complying methods)
(Complying methods)
 
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==Complying methods==
 
==Complying methods==
  
[[Majority-choice approval]], [[Schulze method|cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping]] and [[approval voting|approval]] methods comply with the weak defensive strategy criterion, while [[Range voting]], [[Borda count]], [[plurality voting]], and [[instant-runoff voting]] do not comply.
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[[Majority-choice approval]], [[Schulze method|Schulze]], and [[approval voting|approval]] methods comply with the weak defensive strategy criterion, while [[Range voting]], [[Borda count]], [[plurality voting]], and [[instant-runoff voting]] do not comply.
  
 
==Commentary==
 
==Commentary==

Latest revision as of 18:06, 3 December 2005

The weak defensive strategy criterion is .... [Please help complete this article.]

Statement of criterion

If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one candidate over another.

Complying methods

Majority-choice approval, Schulze, and approval methods comply with the weak defensive strategy criterion, while Range voting, Borda count, plurality voting, and instant-runoff voting do not comply.

Commentary

WDSC is identical to the Strong Defensive Strategy criterion (SDSC), except that the phrase "or falsely voting two candidates equal" is removed from the end. That difference allows the approval method to comply.

Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org

External links

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