Difference between revisions of "Schulze method"
(→External Resources: I don't think that I confuse SSD and CSSD on my site... the difference is in the stopping rule...) |
(→Satisfied Criteria) |
||
Line 186: | Line 186: | ||
# [[Tactical voting|invulnerability to compromising]] | # [[Tactical voting|invulnerability to compromising]] | ||
# [[Tactical voting|invulnerability to burying]] | # [[Tactical voting|invulnerability to burying]] | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
# [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] | # [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] | ||
Revision as of 15:49, 18 May 2005
Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping (CSSD) is a voting system developed by Markus Schulze that selects a single winner using votes that express preferences. CSSD can also be used to create a sorted list of winners. CSSD is also known as "Schwartz Sequential Dropping", "Beatpath Method", "Beatpath Winner", "Path Voting", "Path Winner", and "Schulze Method".
If there is a candidate who is preferred over the other candidates, when compared in turn with each of the others, CSSD guarantees that that candidate will win. Because of this property, CSSD is (by definition) a Condorcet method. Note that this is different from some other preference voting systems such as Borda and Instant-runoff voting, which do not make this guarantee.
Contents
The Schwartz Set
The definition of a Schwartz set, as used in CSSD, is as follows:
- An unbeaten set is a set of candidates of whom none is beaten by anyone outside that set.
- An innermost unbeaten set is an unbeaten set that doesn't contain a smaller unbeaten set.
- The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets.
Procedure
The voters cast their ballots by ranking the candidates according to their preferences, just like for any other Condorcet election.
CSSD uses Condorcet pairwise matchups between the candidates and a winner is chosen in each of the matchups.
From there, CSSD operates as follows to select a winner (or create a ranked list):
- Calculate the Schwartz set based only on undropped defeats.
- If there are no defeats among the members of that set then they (plural in the case of a tie) win and the count ends.
- Otherwise, drop the weakest defeat among the candidates of that set. Go to 1.
An Example
The Situation
Imagine an election for the capital of Tennessee, a state in the United States that is over 500 miles east-to-west, and only 110 miles north-to-south. Let's say the candidates for the capital are Memphis (on the far west end), Nashville (in the center), Chattanooga (129 miles southeast of Nashville), and Knoxville (on the far east side, 114 northeast of Chattanooga). Here's the population breakdown by metro area (surrounding county):
- Memphis (Shelby County): 826,330
- Nashville (Davidson County): 510,784
- Chattanooga (Hamilton County): 285,536
- Knoxville (Knox County): 335,749
Let's say that in the vote, the voters vote based on geographic proximity. Assuming that the population distribution of the rest of Tennessee follows from those population centers, one could easily envision an election where the percentages of votes would be as follows:
42% of voters (close to Memphis) |
26% of voters (close to Nashville) |
15% of voters (close to Chattanooga) |
17% of voters (close to Knoxville) |
The results would be tabulated as follows:
A | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Memphis | Nashville | Chattanooga | Knoxville | ||
B | Memphis | [A] 58% [B] 42% | [A] 58% [B] 42% | [A] 58% [B] 42% | |
Nashville | [A] 42% [B] 58% | [A] 32% [B] 68% | [A] 32% [B] 68% | ||
Chattanooga | [A] 42% [B] 58% | [A] 68% [B] 32% | [A] 17% [B] 83% | ||
Knoxville | [A] 42% [B] 58% | [A] 68% [B] 32% | [A] 83% [B] 17% | ||
Pairwise election results (won-lost-tied): | 0-3-0 | 3-0-0 | 2-1-0 | 1-2-0 | |
Votes against in worst pairwise defeat: | 58% | N/A | 68% | 83% |
- [A] indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the column caption to the candidate listed in the row caption
- [B] indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the row caption to the candidate listed in the column caption
- [NP] indicates voters who expressed no preference between either candidate
Pairwise Winners
First, list every pair, and determine the winner:
Pair | Winner |
---|---|
Memphis (42%) vs. Nashville (58%) | Nashville 58% |
Memphis (42%) vs. Chattanooga (58%) | Chattanooga 58% |
Memphis (42%) vs. Knoxville (58%) | Knoxville 58% |
Nashville (68%) vs. Chattanooga (32%) | Nashville 68% |
Nashville (68%) vs. Knoxville (32%) | Nashville 68% |
Chattanooga (83%) vs. Knoxville (17%) | Chattanooga: 83% |
Note that absolute counts of votes can be used, or percentages of the total number of votes; it makes no difference.
Dropping
Next we start with our list of cities and their matchup wins/defeats
- Nashville 3-0
- Chattanooga 2-1
- Knoxville 1-2
- Memphis 0-3
Technically, the Schwartz set is simply Nashville as it beat all others 3 to 0.
Therefore, Nashville is the winner.
Ambiguity Resolution Example
Let's say there was an ambiguity. For a simple situation involving candidates A, B, and C.
- A > B 72%
- B > C 68%
- C > A 52%
In this situation the Schwartz set is A, B, and C as they all beat someone.
CSSD then says to drop the weakest defeat, so we drop C > A and are left with
- A > B 72% (as C has been removed)
Therefore, A is the winner.
(It may be more accessible to phrase that as "drop the weakest win", though purists may complain.)
Summary
In the (first) example election, the winner is Nashville. This would be true for any Condorcet method. Using the first-past-the-post system and some other systems, Memphis would have won the election by having the most people, even though Nashville won every simulated pairwise election outright. Using Instant-runoff voting in this example would result in Knoxville winning, even though more people preferred Nashville over Knoxville.
Satisfied Criteria
CSSD satisfies the following criteria:
- Monotonicity criterion
- Pareto criterion
- Condorcet criterion
- Smith criterion (aka Generalized Condorcet criterion)
- local independence from irrelevant alternatives
- Schwartz criterion
- Strategy-Free criterion
- Generalized Strategy-Free criterion
- Strong Defensive Strategy criterion
- Weak Defensive Strategy criterion
- Summability criterion
- Independence of clones
CSSD violates the following criteria:
- Participation criterion
- Consistency criterion
- invulnerability to compromising
- invulnerability to burying
- Favorite Betrayal criterion
Use of CSSD
CSSD is not currently used in government elections. However, it is starting to receive support in some public organizations. Organizations which currently use CSSD are:
- the Debian project (See here and here!)
- the Software in the Public Interest (SPI) project (See here!)
- the UserLinux project
- the Park Alumni Society (PAS) (See here!)
- the Blitzed project (See here!)
- the Leader of the Free World (LFW) project (See here!)
- the L'ExpÃƒÂ©rience DÃƒÂ©mocratique (DemExp) project (See section 14.6 of this paper!)
- the Glasnost / Easter Eggs / libre-entreprise project
- the Green Mountain Mutual Aid (GMMA) project
- the Kingman Hall (See here and here!)
- the Johns Hopkins Animation Club (JHAC)
- the Haifa Linux Club (Haifux) (See here!)
- the Free Software Club of Kirksville (FSCK) (See here!)
- the College of Science Students' Advisory Council (COSSAC)
- the NationStates Wiki (NSwiki) project (See here!)
- the Sparta Wiki project
External Resources
- A mailing list containing technical discussions about election methods
- electionmethods.org where CSSD is also called "Schwartz Sequential Dropping" and "Beatpath Winner"
- Election Methods Resource where CSSD is called "Schulze"
- Accurate Democracy where CSSD is called "Schulze", "Schwartz Sequential Dropping", and "Beatpath"
- The Maximize Affirmed Majorities voting procedure (MAM) where CSSD is called "Path Winner"
- A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method (PDF) by Markus Schulze (mirror1, mirror2)
- Descriptions of ranked-ballot voting methods where CSSD is called "Schulze"
- Voting methods resource page where CSSD is also called "beatpath"
This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Wikipedia (view authors). |