Difference between revisions of "Mutual majority criterion"

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:''If there is a majority of voters for which it is true that they all rank a set of candidates above all others, then one of these candidates must win.''
 
:''If there is a majority of voters for which it is true that they all rank a set of candidates above all others, then one of these candidates must win.''
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This is often simply called the '''Majority criterion'''.
  
 
Systems which pass:
 
Systems which pass:
  
[[Borda-Elimination]], [[Bucklin]], [[Coombs]], [[IRV]], [[Kemeny-Young]], [[Nanson (original)]], [[Pairwise-Elimination]], [[Ranked Pairs]], [[Schulze]], [[Smith//Minmax]]
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[[Borda-Elimination]], [[Bucklin]], [[Coombs]], [[IRV]], [[Kemeny-Young]], [[Nanson (original)]], [[Raynaud|Pairwise-Elimination]], [[Ranked Pairs]], [[Schulze]], [[Smith//Minmax]], [[Descending Solid Coalitions]]
  
 
Systems which fail:  
 
Systems which fail:  

Revision as of 21:43, 22 March 2005

The Mutual majority criterion is a criterion for evaluating voting systems. It applies to ranked ballot elections. It can be stated as follows:

If there is a majority of voters for which it is true that they all rank a set of candidates above all others, then one of these candidates must win.

This is often simply called the Majority criterion.

Systems which pass:

Borda-Elimination, Bucklin, Coombs, IRV, Kemeny-Young, Nanson (original), Pairwise-Elimination, Ranked Pairs, Schulze, Smith//Minmax, Descending Solid Coalitions

Systems which fail:

Black, Borda, Dodgson, Minmax, Sum of Defeats