Difference between revisions of "Method support poll"

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*'''James Green-Armytage'''
 
*'''James Green-Armytage'''
Support: [[cardinal pairwise]] with [[beatpath]], [[ranked pairs]], [[river]], or [[sequential dropping]], [[CWP|AWP]], [[Candidate withdrawal option|CWO-IRV]], [[ER-IRV|ER-IRV(whole)]], [[Approval voting]], [[ER-IRV|ER-IRV(fractional)]], [[IRV]]
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'''Support:''' [[cardinal pairwise]] with [[beatpath]], [[ranked pairs]],  
 
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[[river]], or [[sequential dropping]], [[CWP|AWP]], [[Candidate withdrawal option|CWO-IRV]],
Close to supporting: [[DMC]], [[CDTT|CDTT, IRV]], [[Smith//minimax]]
+
[[ER-IRV|ER-IRV(whole)]], [[Approval voting]], [[ER-IRV|ER-IRV(fractional)]], [[IRV]]
 
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'''Close to supporting:''' [[DMC]], [[CDTT|CDTT, IRV]], [[Smith//minimax]]
Oppose: [[Borda count]]
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'''Oppose:''' [[Borda count]]
 
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'''Close to opposing:''' [[Minimax|minmax]], [[MMPO]], [[Bucklin]], [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]]
Close to opposing: [[Minimax|minmax]], [[MMPO]], [[Bucklin]], [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]]
 
  
 
*'''Kevin Venzke'''
 
*'''Kevin Venzke'''
''In general I prefer methods without [[favorite betrayal]] incentive. I insist on [[Minimal Defense criterion|minimal defense]] or something similar.''
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''In general I prefer methods without [[favorite betrayal]] incentive. I  
 
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insist on [[Minimal Defense criterion|minimal defense]] or something similar.''
Support: [[ICA]], [[Approval voting]]
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'''Support:''' [[ICA]], [[Approval voting]]
 
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'''Close to supporting:''' [[Schulze method|Schulze]], Tideman, or River (using winning votes  
Close to supporting: [[Schulze method|Schulze]], Tideman, or River (using winning votes or possibly [[cardinal pairwise|AWP]]), [[ER-Bucklin]](whole), [[MAMPO]]
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or possibly [[cardinal pairwise|AWP]]), [[ER-Bucklin]](whole), [[MAMPO]]
 
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'''Support for legislatures only:''' [[CDTT]]-[[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]] combination methods
Support for legislatures only: [[CDTT]]-[[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]] combination methods
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'''Oppose:''' [[plurality voting|plurality]], [[IRV]], [[ER-IRV]], margins, [[Borda count|Borda]],
 
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[[DSC]], rating ballots
Oppose: [[plurality voting|plurality]], [[IRV]], [[ER-IRV]], margins, [[Borda count|Borda]], [[DSC]], rating ballots
 
  
 
*'''Juho Laatu'''
 
*'''Juho Laatu'''
Support:
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'''Support:'''
*[[Condorcet Criterion|Condorcet]]: best for contentious elections if burying threat considered not too bad
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[[Condorcet Criterion|Condorcet]]: best for contentious elections if burying threat considered not too bad
*[[Minmax|Minmax(margins)]]: my default reference point, good utility function, strategy resistance maybe not that bad
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[[Minmax|Minmax(margins)]]: my default reference point, good utility function, strategy resistance  
*Path based ([[Schulze method|Schulze]] etc.) and winning votes: ok but lots of work for small improvements/changes (that are not all positive)
+
maybe not that bad
*Pairwise comparison methods enhanced with additional approval or rating information: ok as well if not too complex for the voters
+
Path based ([[Schulze method|Schulze]] etc.) and winning votes: ok but lots of work for small  
*[[Approval voting|Approval]]: clean method and at least some improvement to the commonly user methods
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improvements/changes (that are not all positive)
*Best [[IRV]] methods (if pairwise comparison based methods are out of question)
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Pairwise comparison methods enhanced with additional approval or rating information: ok as well if  
 
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not too complex for the voters
Close to supporting: [[Runoff voting|Two round system]] (not that bad for multiparty countries)
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[[Approval voting|Approval]]: clean method and at least some improvement to the commonly user  
 
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methods
Not supporting: Rating based methods (maybe not feasible for contentious elections like the government official elections of this query, but good for non-contentious elections)
+
Best [[IRV]] methods (if pairwise comparison based methods are out of question)
 
+
'''Close to supporting:''' [[Runoff voting|Two round system]] (not that bad for multiparty countries)
Oppose:
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'''Not supporting:''' Rating based methods (maybe not feasible for contentious elections like the  
*[[plurality voting|Plurality]] (except that it is ok for two party countries IF they want to stay that way)
+
government official elections of this query, but good for non-contentious elections)
*Regional winner gets all votes of that region
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'''Oppose:'''
*[[Borda count|Borda]] and many other ("more heuristic") methods
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[[plurality voting|Plurality]] (except that it is ok for two party countries IF they want to stay  
 +
that way)
 +
Regional winner gets all votes of that region
 +
[[Borda count|Borda]] and many other ("more heuristic") methods
  
 
==Legislative election methods==
 
==Legislative election methods==
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*'''James Green-Armytage'''
 
*'''James Green-Armytage'''
Support [[CPO-STV]], [[single transferable vote]]
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'''Support:''' [[CPO-STV]], [[single transferable vote]]
 
+
'''Close to opposing:''' [[Cumulative voting]], [[limited voting]], [[SNTV]]
Close to opposing: [[Cumulative voting]], [[limited voting]], [[SNTV]]
 
  
 
*'''Kevin Venzke'''
 
*'''Kevin Venzke'''
Support open party list (approval component), closed party list, possibly a proportional approval scheme
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'''Support:''' open party list (approval component), closed party list,  
 +
possibly a proportional approval scheme
  
 
*'''Juho Laatu'''
 
*'''Juho Laatu'''
Support:
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'''Support:'''
*Open party list enhanced with hierarchical structure
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Open party list enhanced with hierarchical structure
*[[Open list|Open party list]]
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[[Open list|Open party list]]
*[[STV]] (non-party-based votes are both good and bad)
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[[STV]] (non-party-based votes are both good and bad)
*Regional representation (various styles to complement other methods)
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Regional representation (various styles to complement other methods)
 
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'''Close to supporting:''' [[Closed list|Closed party list]], [[CPO-STV]] (complexity problems)
Close to supporting: [[Closed list|Closed party list]], [[CPO-STV]] (complexity problems)
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'''Not supporting:''' Two party methods (ok if kept intentionally, not just because of fear of  
 
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changes or to stay in power)
Not supporting: Two party methods (ok if kept intentionally, not just because of fear of changes or to stay in power)
 
  
 
== See also ==
 
== See also ==
 
*[[Method evaluation poll]]
 
*[[Method evaluation poll]]

Revision as of 17:09, 9 September 2005

Method support poll. Anyone with an interest in voting methods is welcome to participate. Do not alter the entries of any other participant. In this context, "supporting" a method means that you would an effort to adopt this method in the place of a method that you don't "support". If you oppose a method, that means that you might attempt to prevent the adoption of that method, even as a replacement for a method not on your "support" list. There is no need to list every method that you oppose; just those that you think are worth mentioning, i.e. at least somewhat controversial. Feel free to rank your supported methods in order of preference, or supply some other kind of comparison between them.


Single winner election methods

Which single-winner election methods do you support for the election of government officials? Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that you support the method for local, state, and federal elections.


  • James Green-Armytage
Support: cardinal pairwise with beatpath, ranked pairs, 
river, or sequential dropping, AWP, CWO-IRV,
ER-IRV(whole), Approval voting, ER-IRV(fractional), IRV
Close to supporting: DMC, CDTT, IRV, Smith//minimax
Oppose: Borda count
Close to opposing: minmax, MMPO, Bucklin, Descending Acquiescing Coalitions
  • Kevin Venzke
In general I prefer methods without favorite betrayal incentive. I 
insist on minimal defense or something similar.
Support: ICA, Approval voting
Close to supporting: Schulze, Tideman, or River (using winning votes 
or possibly AWP), ER-Bucklin(whole), MAMPO
Support for legislatures only: CDTT-Later-no-harm combination methods
Oppose: plurality, IRV, ER-IRV, margins, Borda,
DSC, rating ballots
  • Juho Laatu
Support:
Condorcet: best for contentious elections if burying threat considered not too bad
Minmax(margins): my default reference point, good utility function, strategy resistance 
maybe not that bad
Path based (Schulze etc.) and winning votes: ok but lots of work for small 
improvements/changes (that are not all positive)
Pairwise comparison methods enhanced with additional approval or rating information: ok as well if 
not too complex for the voters
Approval: clean method and at least some improvement to the commonly user 
methods
Best IRV methods (if pairwise comparison based methods are out of question)
Close to supporting: Two round system (not that bad for multiparty countries)
Not supporting: Rating based methods (maybe not feasible for contentious elections like the 
government official elections of this query, but good for non-contentious elections)
Oppose:
Plurality (except that it is ok for two party countries IF they want to stay 
that way)
Regional winner gets all votes of that region
Borda and many other ("more heuristic") methods

Legislative election methods

Which legislative (multi-winner) election methods do you support for the election of government officials? Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that you support the method for local, state, and federal elections.


  • James Green-Armytage
Support: CPO-STV, single transferable vote
Close to opposing: Cumulative voting, limited voting, SNTV
  • Kevin Venzke
Support: open party list (approval component), closed party list, 
possibly a proportional approval scheme
  • Juho Laatu
Support:
Open party list enhanced with hierarchical structure
Open party list
STV (non-party-based votes are both good and bad)
Regional representation (various styles to complement other methods)
Close to supporting: Closed party list, CPO-STV (complexity problems)
Not supporting: Two party methods (ok if kept intentionally, not just because of fear of 
changes or to stay in power)

See also