Difference between revisions of "Method evaluation poll"

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  [[ER-Bucklin|ER-Bucklin(whole)]]
 
  [[ER-Bucklin|ER-Bucklin(whole)]]
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  [[ER-Bucklin|ER-Bucklin(fractional)]]
 
  [[ER-Bucklin|ER-Bucklin(fractional)]]
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  [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]] (DSC)
 
  [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]] (DSC)
 
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Revision as of 17:57, 9 September 2005

Please rate the following single-winner methods on a scale from 0 to 10, on functional merit alone. That is, leaving the issue of public salability aside, how well will the method perform in a large, contentious electorate? Decimal ratings are allowed.

The answers you give on your first pass through the survey need not be final. Please feel free to change/update your answers as many times as you like. You may leave a question mark next to your score for a given method if you are particularly uncertain about that score, and you may also substitute a question mark for the number if you feel unable to evalute the method.

Feel free to add more methods to the poll, especially interesting ones! This goes without saying, but please don't change other people's ratings! Try to keep the columns tidy so that it's clear whose scores are whose. The format of this poll is based on that of the essential questions poll. Please identify yourself by your initials in the body of the poll, and in the participants section at the top of the poll. This poll will be ongoing; that is, it has no closing date. Also, there is no official tally method, and no official winner will be declared.

the participants

JG James Green-Armytage
CB Chris Benham
KV Kevin Venzke
DK Dave Ketchum
MO Mike Ossipoff 
RL Rob Lanphier
JF Jeff Fisher

the methods

binary input

   JG   CB   KV   DK   MO   RL   JF
Plurality
    2    2    2    2    0    0    0
Two round runoff
    3    5    3    3    0    2    2
Approval
   5?    6    8    5    9    5    8
Random Ballot
    0    1    1    1    0    0    1

ranking input

not Condorcet-efficient

   JG   CB   KV   DK   MO   RL   JF
Borda count     
   1     3    0    0    0    0    4
IRV without equal rankings
   4     7    3    3    0    4    2
ER-IRV(whole)
   6     4    ?    ?    0    ?    2
ER-IRV(fractional)
   6     6    3    ?    0    ?    2
Bucklin without equal rankings
  3?    6.5   6    0         ?    6
ER-Bucklin(whole)
5.5?          7         2    ?    4
ER-Bucklin(fractional)
   ?          5              ?    5
Descending Acquiescing Coalitions (DSC)
              4                     
Descending Solid Coalitions
              2

nearly Condorcet-efficient

   JG   CB   KV   DK   MO   RL   JF
minmax(pairwise opposition)
    5    4    4    ?         ?    4
CDTT,IRV
    7    9    5    ?         ?    4
CDTT,minmax(pairwise opposition)
    ?    5    6    ?         ?    5
Improved Condorcet Approval (ICA), a.k.a. Condorcet//Approval with FBC tweak)
   6?         9    ?         ?    5
Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval (MDDA)
   6?   7.5?  9        10    ?    6

Condorcet-efficient

   JG   CB   KV   DK   MO   RL   JF
ranked pairs(WV)
    7    7    8    8    4    9    8
ranked pairs(margins)
    2    4    3    3    0    6    ?
river(wv)
    7         8    7    4    ?    9
beatpath(WV)
    7    7    8    7    4    9    8
beatpath(margins)  
    2    4    3    3    0    5    ?
sequential dropping(WV)
    7    ?    7    ?    4    ?    8
minmax(WV)                  
    4   ?     7    7    3    5    7
minmax(margins)     
    1    ?    3    3    0    5    ?
Smith//minmax(WV)    
    6    ?    7    ?  3.5    9    8
Smith//minmax(margins)
    2    ?    3    ?    0    5    ?
Nanson
  5.5?   ?    3    ?    0    ?    5
Raynaud
   6?    ?    3    3    0    ?    6

ranking input with approval cutoff

   JG   CB   KV   DK    MO   RL   JF
definite majority choice a.k.a. ranked approval voting
  6.5  8.5    6    3          ?    5
approval weighted pairwise (e.g. with ranked pairs base)
    9    8    7    3     3    ?    4
approval margins
  5.5    9    ?    3          ?    ?
democratic fair choice (DFC)
   ?          3    3          ?    4
Schwartz//Approval or Smith//Approval (See Condorcet//Approval)
              4                   10
Condorcet//Approval
              4                   10

rating input

   JG   KV   DK   MO    RL
range voting (ratings summation)
  5.5    5    2   8.75
median ratings
    3    4    2
ranked pairs(cardinal pairwise)
  9.5    5    2    4
beatpath(cardinal pairwise)
  9.5    5    2    4

other

   JG   DK   MO
CWO-ER-IRV(whole)
    7    1    4
CWO-ER-IRV(fractional)
    8    1    4
CWO-ranked pairs(WV)
    8    1    5
CWO-ranked ballot plurality
    6    1     1
minmax(pairwise opposition) with AERLO and ATLO
    4    ?    
MMPO with AERLO, ATLO, & Power Truncation
    ?        
MMPO with (only) Power Truncation 
    ?         
beatpath(WV) with AERLO and ATLO
    8    ?    4
beatpath(WV) with strong/weak preference option
  7.5    ?    4
random jury method
    ?         1

See also