Difference between revisions of "Condorcet//Approval"

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===Favorite Betrayal criterion compliance===
 
===Favorite Betrayal criterion compliance===
[[Approval voting]]'s satisfaction of the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] can be preserved in Condorcet//Approval by using the [[tied at the top]] rule. This results in the [[Improved Condorcet Approval]] method devised by Kevin Venzke.
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[[Approval voting]]'s satisfaction of the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] can be preserved in Condorcet//Approval by using the [[tied at the top]] rule. This results in the [[Improved Condorcet Approval]] method. However, this variant technically isn't [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]-compliant.
  
 
[[Category:Condorcet method]]
 
[[Category:Condorcet method]]

Revision as of 20:05, 28 July 2005

Condorcet//Approval is an election method according to which the Condorcet winner is elected if one exists, otherwise the Approval voting winner is elected. Approval can be designated by a cutoff placed within the ranking by the voter. Alternatively, all explicitly ranked candidates on a ballot could be considered approved.

Burial resistance

Condorcet methods are generally vulnerable to burying strategy. One faction buries a candidate by ranking him insincerely below other candidates. This is an attempt to give this candidate new or stronger pairwise defeats.

When all explicitly ranked candidates are considered approved, Condorcet//Approval makes burying strategy less likely to succeed than in other Condorcet methods. Burying is only effective when it prevents the targeted candidate from being the Condorcet winner. But a faction can't succeed in this task without then being counted as approving the candidate(s) beneath which the targeted candidate was insincerely ranked. This makes it quite likely that burying strategy will backfire, and cause a candidate to be elected who is actually liked less than the targeted candidate.

Favorite Betrayal criterion compliance

Approval voting's satisfaction of the Favorite Betrayal criterion can be preserved in Condorcet//Approval by using the tied at the top rule. This results in the Improved Condorcet Approval method. However, this variant technically isn't Condorcet-compliant.