Difference between revisions of "Condorcet//Approval"
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'''Condorcet//Approval''' is an election method
'''Condorcet//Approval''' is an election method which the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] winner is elected if one exists, otherwise the [[Approval voting]] winner is elected. Approval
be designated by a cutoff by the voter . Alternatively, all explicitly ranked candidates could be considered approved .
Revision as of 14:42, 22 August 2005
Condorcet//Approval is an election method by which the Condorcet winner is elected if one exists, otherwise the Approval voting winner is elected. The approval winner may (Smith//Approval) or may not be limited to the Smith set.
Approval could be designated by a cutoff ranked among alternatives by the voter (explicit approval). Alternatively, if truncation is allowed, all explicitly ranked candidates could be considered to be approved (implicit approval).
Condorcet methods are generally vulnerable to burying strategy. One faction buries a candidate by ranking him insincerely below other candidates. This is an attempt to give this candidate new or stronger pairwise defeats.
When all explicitly ranked candidates are considered approved, Condorcet//Approval makes burying strategy less likely to succeed than in other Condorcet methods. Burying is only effective when it prevents the targeted candidate from being the Condorcet winner. But a faction can't succeed in this task without then being counted as approving the candidate(s) beneath which the targeted candidate was insincerely ranked. This makes it quite likely that burying strategy will backfire, and cause a candidate to be elected who is actually liked less than the targeted candidate.
One drawback in proposing implicit approval of all explicitly ranked alternatives is that, in general elections, many "sincere" (naive) voters will feel entitled to rank all alternatives. Many may then bristle at the assertion that they approve of unsavory candidates by exercising their franchise to distinguish between lesser and greater "evils". This perception may be mitigated somewhat by a change in terminology. Even so, voters or legislators may balk at reform if they anticipate voter frustration.
Favorite Betrayal criterion compliance
Approval voting's satisfaction of the Favorite Betrayal criterion can be preserved in Condorcet//Approval by using the tied at the top rule. This results in the Improved Condorcet Approval method. However, this variant technically isn't Condorcet-compliant.
Condorcet//Approval satisfies Condorcet and always elects a majority favorite, but doesn't satisfy Smith or the Majority criterion for solid coalitions. It satisfies Minimal Defense (and the Strong Defensive Strategy criterion), the Plurality criterion, and monotonicity.