Method support poll

Method support poll. Anyone with an interest in voting methods is welcome to participate. Do not alter the entries of any other participant. In this context, "supporting" a method means that you would support an effort to adopt this method in the place of a method that you don't "support". If you oppose a method, that means that you might attempt to prevent the adoption of that method, even as a replacement for a method not on your "support" list. There is no need to list every method that you oppose; just those that you think are worth mentioning, i.e. at least somewhat controversial. Feel free to rank your supported methods in order of preference, or supply some other kind of comparison between them. Feel free also to modify your answers at any time; there is no closing date for the poll.

Single winner election methods
Which single-winner election methods do you support for the election of government officials? Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that you support the method for local, state, and federal elections.

Support: cardinal pairwise with beatpath, ranked pairs, river, or Smith sequential dropping, AWP, CWO-IRV, ER-IRV(whole), Approval voting, ER-IRV(fractional), IRV Close to supporting: DMC/RAV, Smith//IRV, CDTT,IRV, Smith//minimax Oppose: Borda count Close to opposing: minmax, MMPO, Bucklin, Descending Acquiescing Coalitions
 * James Green-Armytage

''In general I prefer methods without favorite betrayal incentive. I '' insist on minimal defense or something similar. Support: ICA, Approval voting Close to supporting: Schulze, Tideman, or River (using winning votes  or possibly AWP), ER-Bucklin(whole), MAMPO, MDDA Support for legislatures only: CDTT-Later-no-harm combination methods Oppose: plurality, IRV, ER-IRV, margins, Borda, DSC, rating ballots
 * Kevin Venzke

Support: Condorcet: best for contentious elections if burying threat considered not too bad Minmax(margins): my default reference point, good utility function, strategy resistance maybe not that bad Path based (Schulze etc.) and winning votes: ok but lots of work for small improvements/changes (that are not all positive) Pairwise comparison methods enhanced with additional approval or rating information: ok as well if not too complex for the voters Approval: clean method and at least some improvement to the commonly user methods Best IRV methods (if pairwise comparison based methods are out of question) Close to supporting: Two round system (not that bad for multiparty countries) Not supporting: Rating based methods (maybe not feasible for contentious elections like the government official elections of this query, but good for non-contentious elections) Oppose: Plurality (except that it is ok for two party countries IF they want to stay that way) Regional winner gets all votes of that region Borda and many other ("more heuristic") methods
 * Juho Laatu

Support: IRV Close to supporting:Condorcet- any completion method, top-two runoff. An improvement on Plurality: Approval voting, Bucklin, Range voting. Close to opposing: Borda. Oppose: Plurality, the use of single seat methods in multi-member districts.
 * David Gamble

Support: SSD, and Methods that meet FBC. These include Approval, Range Voting, MDDA, MDDB, MDD, ER-Bucklin(whole), and MAMPO. Oppose: methods other than SSD that don't meet FBC (I'm referring to what I'd support or propose when a proposal is being chosen, not what I'd support or oppose after it has been put to the public).
 * Mike Ossipoff

Support: Approval voting, Approval-Condorcet Hybrids, Condorcet//Approval and variants (e.g., Improved Condorcet Approval). Close to supporting: Condorcet - any completion method, provided the result is a member of the Schwartz set. Close to opposing: Borda Oppose: Plurality, Random Ballot
 * Allen Smith

Legislative election methods
Which legislative (multi-winner) election methods do you support for the election of government officials? Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that you support the method for local, state, and federal elections.

Support: CPO-STV, single transferable vote Close to opposing: Cumulative voting, limited voting, SNTV Conditional support: Support party list as a transitional system in some cases where infrastructure is limited, and where a large part of the population lacks the numerical literacy skills need for an STV vote.
 * James Green-Armytage

Support: open party list (approval component), closed party list, possibly a proportional approval scheme
 * Kevin Venzke

Support: Open party list enhanced with hierarchical structure Open party list STV (non-party-based votes are both good and bad) Regional representation (various styles to complement other methods) Close to supporting: Closed party list, CPO-STV (complexity problems) Not supporting: Two party methods (ok if kept intentionally, not just because of fear of changes or to stay in power)
 * Juho Laatu

Support: single transferable vote, CPO-STV. Close to supporting: Any other proportional method - open party list, closed party list, semi-open party list, MMP. '''Improvement on single seats methods for multi-member bodies:'''SNTV, Limited vote, Cumulative voting. Oppose: Single seat methods for multi-member bodies in single seats,single seat methods in multi-member districts.
 * David Gamble